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from the literary side, these "Studies" are of great interest and importance.

I. WOODBRIDGE RILEY.

VASSAR COLLEGE.

## JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. February, 1909. *Les deux erreurs de la métaphysique* (113-141): J. DE GAULTIER. - The two errors of metaphysics are (1) assuming itself to have practical value as a science of the good instead of remaining purely speculative, and (2) attributing objective being to time, space, and matter. *Examen critique des systèmes classiques sur les origines de la pensée religieuse* (2<sup>e</sup> et dernier article pp. 142-162): E. DURKHEIM. - As neither Naturalism nor Animism is adequate to explain the origin of religion, this must be sought in a more fundamental and primitive cult. *De la connection des idées* (pp. 163-179): E. TASSY. - An application of the author's "ideative erethism" to complete the present inadequate theories of the association of ideas. F. PILLON, *L'Année philosophique* (1907): J. DELVAILLE. *In Honour of W. James, Essays Philosophical and Psychological*: A. PENJON. Morselli, *Introduzione alla filosofia moderna*: J. PÉRÈS. R. Manzoni, *Essais de philosophie positive* (trad. franc.): F. PAULHAN. F. THOMAS, *L'éducation dans la famille: les péchés des parents*: G. COMPAYRÉ. E. MACH, *La connaissance et l'erreur*: A. LALANDE. L. ROBIN, *La théorie platonicienne des idées et des nombres d'après Aristote*: C. HOIT. R. PICARD, *La philosophie sociale de Renouvier*: G. L. DUPRAT. KINKEL, *Geschichte der Philosophie als Einleitung*: C. HUIT. GILBERT, *Die meteorologischen Theorien der Griechischen Alterthums*: C. HUIT. J. ADAM, *The Religious Teachers of Greece*: C. HUIT. KANT, *Gesammelte Schriften*: J. SEGOND. *Revue des périodiques étrangers*.

Cramanssel, E. "*Le Premier éveil intellectuel de l'enfant*." Paris: Félix Alcan. 1909. Pp. 192.

Croce, Benedetto. "*Filosofia della practica*." Bari: Gius, Laterza, e Figli. 1909. xix + 415.

Enrignes, Frédéric. "*Les problèmes de la science et de la logique*." Paris: Félix Alcan. 1909. Pp. 256. 3 fr. \$0.75.

Joussain, A. "*Le fondement psychologique de la morale*." Paris: Félix Alcan. 1909. Pp. viii + 144.

Kronenberg, M. "*Geschichte des deutschen Idealismus*." Erster Band: die idealistische Ideen-Entwicklung von ihren Anfängen bis Kant. Munich: Oscar Beck. 1909. Pp. xii + 428. M. 11.

Matičević, Von S. "*Zur Grundlegung die Logik*." Wien und Leipzig: Wilhelm Braumüller. 1909. Pp. 192.

- Offner, Max. "*Das Gedächtniss. Die Ergebnisse der experimentellen Psychologie und ihrer Anwendung in Unterricht und Erziehung.*" Berlin: Reuter und Reichard. 1909. Pp. vi + 275. M. 4.50.
- Perrier, Joseph Louis. "*The Revival of Scholastic Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century.*" New York: The Columbia University Press. 1909. Pp. viii + 344.
- Prezzolini, Guiseppe. "*Benedetto Croce.*" Napoli: Riccardo Riccardi. 1909. Pp. 118.
- Urban, Wilbur Marshall. "*Valuation: Its Nature and its Laws—Being an Introduction to the General Theory of Value.*" London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. New York. The Macmillan Co. 1909. Pp. xviii + 433. \$2.75.

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### NOTES AND NEWS

THE following abstract of the paper read by Dr. Hubert Foston on "The Mutual Symbolism of Intelligence and Activity" before the Aristotelian Society on April 5, is from the *Athenæum*: "Intelligence and activity are not so much names of two different facts as indications of two ultimately distinct points of view for considering fact. Intelligence implies procedure by way of definition; but definition can never be completely closed, because experience is continually subject to change. This subjection to change is, from an active point of view, the key to opportunity; it involves a plasticity in fact which leaves room for hope and effort. All definiteness in experience involves the intellectual point of view; all consciousness of process involves an active basis—continuous process being recognized only through active expectation. As neither complete definiteness free from change, nor pure change or movement without form, affords a possible start for interpreting experience, we can not avoid in philosophy a double point of view, at once intellectual and active. This double point of view can not actually be reduced to theoretical unity, since there is really no comparison possible between intelligence and activity, as if they were two kinds of fact. Neither is there any contradiction between them—for contradiction can only be asserted where two matters conflict when seen from a unitary point of view. Since, however, intellect and activity are always mutually implied, reference to the one comes ambiguously to symbolize a reference to the other; and there thus arises the philosophical illusion of a unitary point of view. While intelligence and activity can never fall for us into a unity of comprehension, they do fall into a unity of conspiracy—conspiring to suggest an ideal aim. All that can be known by beings such as ourselves suggests an ideal, either of amelioration or of continuance. But the suggestion of an ideal is not a matter of pure intelligence. We can entertain it as such only because we are active beings. Our activity must be taken seriously. The intellectualist analysis of it by reference to the expansion of an idea against limits, owes its apparent success to our being stirred to be sympathetically active in the very inter-